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BOOK REVIEWS
In the spirit of the author's own introductory comment, it should be borne
in mind that the study of procedural jurisprudence strives for a higher goal
than the imparting of a working knowledge of procedural devices and their
functions. A presentation of the subject in dogmatic fashion which highlights
the hard and Idst statutory rules rather than the problems would paralyze the
imagination and deaden the interest of the student in the material to be taught.
It would operate directly contrary to the educational purpose of the teacher
unless the stimulus for a deeper understanding of the subject is provided in
some other manner. Instruction in procedural law must go beyond the in-
tricate mesh of statutory details to the theoretical and philosophical basis of
the rules of operation which compose the system of procedure. The under-
standing of this basis is indispensible to a comprehension not only of the ad-
jective law, but also of the substantive law. By familiarizing the student with
the background and history of procedure and by illustrating different ap-
proaches to the solution of procedural problems under various systems of
procedure of our days and of the past, he will acquire a foundation for apprais-
ing, criticizing and evaluating the existing rules, rather than accepting them
as dogmas. This will accomplish one of the primary objects of all legal teach-
ing, namely, the sharpening of the student's sense of justice through a critical





JUSTICE IN RussIA. By Harold J. Berman. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1950. Pp. 322. $4.75.
JUSTICE IN RussiA, the latest in a long series of writings on the subject of
Russian law and politics, attempts to cut to the heart of Russian legal thinking
in three swift, bold strokes.
Covering each important field of Soviet law, it -presents an incisive and
well written study with an appeal alike to specialists and laymen. The ap-
proach, as stated by the author, is three dimensional. The development of
Soviet law is to be sought in the requirements of a Socialist planned economy,
the operation of the Soviet "parental" concept of a man as a child to be
guided and molded as a ward of the state, and in the influence of Russian
history.
The reviewer is not altogether convinced of the validity of the three dimen-
sional outline as the most useful basis of a thorough study. Stratification of
legal and social phenomena under these headings may well prove unwieldly in
the absence of more carefully selected operational indices. It is difficult to
see, for example, that the arbitrary character of the notorious secret adminis-
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trative tribunals of the M. V. D. emerges from the element of socialism in
Soviet society as one might infer as the author's conclusion from the discussion
of these tribunals under that heading. It appears much more probable that
the use of secret tribunals of this type is symptomatic of the general psychology
of totalitarianism without definite relevancy to its ideological underpinnings.
Evidence that socialistic planning in and of itself tends toward such evil is not
altogether persuasive at this stage. The reviewer finds it difficult moreover to
accept with complete conviction the analysis of Soviet legal manifestations
from the perspective of "parentalism." The "parental" notion which to the
author appears to be endowed with a peculiarly Russian flavor appears to be
little more than a characteristic element of most totalitarian judical ap-
proaches. Despite the fact that the author seems to admit that other perspec-
tives might have relevancy, insufficient consideration is given to a contem-
plation of Soviet official action from the standpoint of the psychological
perspective of the totalitarian regime of the type, for example, suggested by
Harold Lasswell in his developmental projection of the garrison - prison
state. No flaw, of course, can be found in a survey of the history of legal de-
velopment for purposes of general orientation. One is startled, however, to
discover an attempt at the description of "the spirit of Russian law" in thirty-
six pages.
A major flaw emerges from what seems to be a misplaced emphasis on
the alleged uniqueness or originality of facets of the Soviet legal system.
Unique characteristics are attributed to the imprint of Byzantine thought.
The linkage of Byzantine inspiration to Russian legal development, however,
seems occasionally tenuous. The assumption is made by the author that re-
liance upon positive legislation and the enhancement of the subjective
elements of legal doctrine were owed predominantly to Byzantium.
No evidence exists to bear out the author's assertion that "the whole
concept of legislation as a primary source of lasting law emerged in Byzantium."
No evidence exists to sustain the contention that the subjective elements of
intent have been the result of Byzantine as distinct from earlier Roman legis-
lation or judicial interpretation. No evidence warrants the inference that it
was the concept of unjust enrichment that was primarily derived from the
Byzantine law. Fundamental changes had been produced early in Roman
Republican times by way of legislation. One need only point to the role
played by the Senate and the Comitia Tributa in Republican legislation, the
subsequent legislation by what became virtually the right of imperial rescript
as a result of the lex de imperio. It may serve to recall that a wholesale codi-
fication of the marriage law had taken place under the early Empire and that
legislation by the Emperor himself had become full" recognized by the time
of Hadrian (117-138 A. D.). So pronounced was the interdependence of
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Western Roman and Byzantine legislative systems that it became necessary
as late as 439 A.D. through the Codex Theodosianus to provide that Western
Roman legislation was no longer to be binding on the Empire in the East
and conversely that Byzantine legislation was not to be binding upon the
Western Empire. Identical inaccuracies mar the author's conclusions con-
cerning the uniqueness of the Byzantine contribution in the requirement of
the mental elements of intent. The concept of Dolus, a conscious infringement
of the law, was known in early Roman Republican times and was supplemented
in imperial days, initially by the concept of Culpa Levis, a negligent wrong-
doing, and, later, by Culpa Lata, a wilful wrongdoing. It is similarly clear
that the concept of unjust enrichment was known long before the Byzantine
legislation which the author assumes to have had the unique influence on
Russian law which he claims.
A further example of similar overemphasis is provided by the suggested
inference that invocation of the doctrine of analogy in Soviet criminal law con-
stituted "revolutionary inovation." While the author is clearly aware of the
multiplicity of historical precedents, the reader may all too easily be misled
into assuming that the doctrine of analogy represents an original Soviet con-
tribution to criminal law. It would have served to point out that the doctrine
of nalogy has been an almost inevitable part of authoritarian criminal legis-
lation since medieval times. Thus, for instance, the doctrine had been officially
incorporated into the so-called "Carolina" criminal code of the German Reich
as early as 1532.
Despite these shortcomings, the reviewer believes that the author has
performed a pioneering task in the scholarly and illuminating appraisal of the
Soviet legal system. The accounts furnished of aspects of the Soviet legal
framework such as labor law, family law, criminal law and legal psychiatry
are uniformly excellent and provide a wealth of vital factual detail which
cannot be found in any single available volume. While some of the conclusions
are controversial, they are stimulating and as a rule adequately supported by
the material adduced.
The defects, of course, are many. None the less JUSTICE IN RUSSIA is
probably the best book in English on its subject matter.
Richard Arens
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Buffalo.
